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AbsTrAcT: This paper explores sources of growth in the Turkish economy by performing 
growth accounting exercises over the 1960–2004 period and relevant subperiods. It also 
analyzes the role of a number of important policy-related factors, such as infrastructure 
investment, macroeconomic instability, and imports, on total factor productivity (TFP) by 
performing cointegration and impulse response analyses. The results suggest that both 
TFP and capital accumulation were crucial sources of growth during the sample period. 
Nevertheless, TFP growth displayed enormous variation from 1960 to 2004. The descrip-
tive and empirical evidence suggests that TFP is positively affected by imports and public 
infrastructure investment and negatively affected by macroeconomic instability. 
KEy words: capital accumulation, cointegration, economic growth, growth accounting, 
impulse response analysis, macroeconomic instability, total factor productivity.
The Turkish economy registered a low and volatile economic growth rate from the 
mid-1970s to 2001, mainly due to an endemic problem of macroeconomic instability.1 
Fortunately, things seem to have changed quite significantly after 2001. From 2002 to 
2005, Turkey simultaneously experienced an unprecedented economic growth rate and 
a significant reduction in the inflation rate.2 Along with other factors,3 sound macroeco-
nomic policies have been crucial to Turkey’s favorable macroeconomic performance 
over the 2002–5 period.
We aim to empirically assess the role of stability of the macroeconomic environment 
on economic growth, particularly on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. To accom-
plish this, it is essential to identify the contribution of capital accumulation and TFP to 
economic growth. Thus, we first analyze the sources of growth in the Turkish economy 
over the 1960–2004 period, as well as over the relevant subperiods (pre-1980 versus 
post-1980), by performing growth accounting exercises.
Mainly motivated by the recent transformation of Turkey’s macroeconomic environ-
ment from unstable to stable, we also analyze the role of several important policy-related 
factors on TFP. To achieve this, we develop a simple cointegration model with four vari-
ables: a macroeconomic instability index, the imports-to-gross national product (GNP) 
ratio, the public infrastructure investment-to-GNP ratio, and TFP. We are particularly 
interested in analyzing the dynamic effects of macroeconomic instability, public infra-
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structure investment, and openness on TFP. To this end, we use a generalized impulse 
response (GIR) analysis. 
Overview of the Turkish Economy, 1960–2004
This section provides a general overview of the macroeconomic history of Turkey from 
1960 to 2004. We focus mainly on growth performance, capital formation, macroeconomic 
instability, and policy changes.4 Table 1 provides summary information on the Turkish 
economy for the decades as well as for the overall period and the relevant subperiods.
In the pre-1980 period, Turkey followed a state-led inward-oriented growth strategy 
that involved import substitution policies and economywide planning by the State Plan-
ning Organization (SPO). Along with trade restrictions and financial repression policies, 
the state made use of heavy public investment, especially in the manufacturing sector, to 
promote industrialization and economic development. From 1960 to 1980, Turkey enjoyed 
a high rate of growth: Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average rate 
of 4.7 percent; there was a rapid rate of capital accumulation, as real capital stock grew 
at an annual average rate of 7 percent, and a relatively high rate of employment growth. 
However, Turkey’s growth performance was even more impressive during the 1960s, 
as real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.4 percent. Despite this performance, 
Turkey only attained a modest rate of capital accumulation—real capital stock grew at 
an annual average rate of 5.9 percent—but the macroeconomic environment was quite 
stable during the 1960s (see Table 1). Figure 1 shows a time plot of the macroeconomic 
instability index (MII).5
The 1970s saw the deepening of industrialization based on Turkey’s import substitu-
tion strategy. The decade was also characterized by the implementation of a strong public 
investment program. Compared to the 1960s, the 1970s growth rate of real capital stock 
(K), public and private investment as a percentage of GNP (Igrat and Iprat), and public 
infrastructure investment as a percentage of GNP (Igirat) increased from 5.9 to 8.0, 5.7 
to 9, 10.2 to 14.2, and 2.2 to 3.5, respectively (see Table 1). During this period, real GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of 4.1 percent.
However, from 1973 to 1977, a polarized political environment led to inadequate 
macroeconomic policy-making. This, in turn, contributed to a rise in macroeconomic 
instability. As a consequence, both inflation and the macroeconomic instability index 
dramatically increased from 5.4 percent and 0.049 points in the 1960s to 27 percent and 
0.118 points in the 1970s, respectively (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Eventually, the import 
substitution strategy reached its limits and Turkey experienced a severe economic crisis 
in 1978–9. The political and macroeconomic instability ended with the January 1980 
economic package and a military regime from 1980 to 1983.
The main characteristics of the early and mid-1980s were strong subsidies to promote 
exports and the gradual phasing in of import liberalization; these were paired with a 
managed floating exchange rate and regulation of capital movements. This structural 
change is reflected both in the exports-to-GNP and imports-to-GNP ratios, which in-
creased from 3.5 percent and 7.8 percent in the 1970s to 9.9 percent and 15.0 percent 
in the 1980s, respectively (see Table 1). The economic role of the state also changed 
dramatically with the January 1980 economic program; for example, the state changed 
its investment strategy from manufacturing to infrastructure. As Table 1 shows, public 
infrastructure investment as a percentage of GNP increased from 3.5 percent in the 1970s 
to 4.6 percent in the 1980s. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The annual average growth rate of real GDP increased from 4.1 percent in the 1970s 
to 5.2 percent in the 1980s. It seems that the export-led growth strategy of the 1980s 
was quite successful, though the impressive export boom was essentially based on the 
productive capacities established during the preceding decade. 
In the early 1980s, Turkey successfully reduced macroeconomic instability (see 
Table 1 and Figure 1), albeit under special conditions (see Celasun and Rodrik 1989). 
However, starting from the late 1980s, political and macroeconomic instability increased 
(see Figure 1) and persisted as endemic characteristics of the Turkish economy during the 
1990s. Populist and myopic policies as well as the associated problems of public-sector 
imbalances were blamed most for the persistence of high macroeconomic instability from 
the late 1980s onward (Ismihan 2003). The governments—usually coalitions—in Turkey 
were able to maintain these unsound policies through reliance on domestic borrowing, 
with the help of capital inflows. However, this strategy was very costly, resulting in high 
interest rates and associated unsustainable debt dynamics during the late 1990s.6 
In December 1999, Turkey, under a three-party coalition, signed a three-year, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF)–based standby agreement mainly aimed at correcting its 
public-sector imbalances. This program failed in February 2001 and real GDP contracted 
by 7.5 percent in 2001. The coalition government signed another program backed by 
the IMF and the World Bank after the crisis. From 2002 onward, this program has been 
implemented by Party of Justice and Development (AKP) governments. 
Fortunately, macroeconomic instability fell dramatically between 2002 and 2004 (see 
Figure 1) and Turkey experienced an unprecedented economic growth rate; real GDP 
grew very rapidly, at an annual average of 7.5 percent, during the 2002–5 period. Decisive 
change in macroeconomic policy, especially fiscal policy, from populist to sound policies 
has been crucial in this improvement. The central bank also successfully reduced the 
inflation rate (CPI) from 68.5 percent in 2001 to 7.7 percent in 2005. However, disap-
pointingly, the high growth rate has failed to generate sufficient employment to overcome 
Turkey’s unemployment problem (see Table 1). 
Figure 1. Time plot of MII, 1960–2004
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Sources of Growth in the Turkish Economy, 1960–2004
Equation (1) provides the basic framework for our growth accounting exercises,7
 gy = αgk + (1 – α)gh + ga , (1)
where gy is growth in output per worker, y is Y/L, α is the share of capital in output, gk is 
growth in capital per worker, k is K/L, ga is TFP growth, and gh is growth in educational 
attainment per worker, h. The equation allows us to determine the importance of the three 
sources in the growth of output per worker, also called the labor productivity growth 
rate. The three terms on the right-hand side represent the three ingredients of growth in 
output per worker (gy):
 1. [αgk] = contribution of growth in capital per worker
 2. [(1 – α)gh] = contribution of improvement in education per worker 
 3. [ga = gy – αgk – (1 – α)gh] = contribution of growth in TFP8
Table 2 summarizes the results of the growth accounting exercises (α = 0.50)9 for the 
individual decades, the overall period, and the relevant subperiods. Figure 2 presents the 
evolution of TFP from 1960 to 2004 to aid in interpreting the results. 
Between 1960 and 2004, physical capital accumulation seems to have been the main 
source of growth (66 percent) in output per worker. TFP contributed about 20 percent and 
human capital accumulation contributed even less, about 15 percent. To obtain detailed 
information about the sources of growth in the Turkish economy, below, we analyze the 
results from the growth accounting exercises for the decades in the relevant subperiods 
(pre-1980 and post-1980).
Inward-Oriented Period, 1960–1979 
During the 1960s, GDP per worker grew at an impressive rate of 3.9 percent.10 The most 
important contributor to this performance was capital accumulation—an increase in 
capital per worker—which accounted for 57 percent of growth in output per worker. This 
accords with the crucial role of the state in capital formation through economywide plan-
ning during the inward-oriented period (see above). TFP growth was another important 
ingredient of growth during the 1960s, accounting for almost one-third of growth. This 
was mainly due to the relatively stable macroeconomic and political environment (see 
Table 1 and Figure 1). Finally, the contribution of human capital, at 11 percent, was very 
weak compared to the other two contributors. 
The growth rate of GDP per worker slowed significantly during the 1970s, from 3.9 
percent in the 1960s to 2.2 percent in the 1970s. The principal reason for this fall-off 
was the decline in TFP growth, which fell from 1.2 percent in the 1960s to –1.3 percent 
in the 1970s (see Table 2). There were three main reasons for this decline: the double oil 
shocks in the 1970s; the polarized and unstable sociopolitical environment, especially 
during the late 1970s; and inadequate macroeconomic management, such as excessive 
reliance on foreign borrowing and delayed stabilizations. All these led to a rise in mac-
roeconomic instability11 and severe economic crisis in 1978–9 (see above). TFP started 
to fall steadily after 1976 (see Figure 2), marking the beginning of the acceleration of 
political and macroeconomic instability (see Figure 1). 
Unfortunately, the decline in TFP growth undermined the contribution of the 1973–77 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 Emerging Markets Finance & Trade
was offset by the sizable contribution of an increase in capital per worker (138 percent). 
During the 1970s, human capital formation was also an important source of growth in 
output per worker, which accounts for about 23 percent of growth. 
Outward-Oriented Period, 1980–2004 
After a slowdown in the 1970s, the growth rate of GDP per worker started to rise in the 
1980s at an annual average of 4 percent, which exceeded the 1960s level of 3.9 percent. 
The main contributor to this performance was an improvement in TFP growth, which 
accounted for 48 percent of growth in output per worker. 
The improvement in TFP growth was related to the following developments. In 1980, 
Turkey made a drastic decision to shift its overall economic strategy from inward-oriented 
to outward-oriented growth. The state also changed its investment strategy from manufac-
turing to infrastructure. In line with these structural changes, the imports-to-GNP ratio, as 
well as the exports-to-GNP ratio, started to pick up over the 1980s (see Table 1). This, in 
turn, helped to increase the TFP by increasing competition and the diffusion of know-how 
from abroad.12 Public infrastructure investment also seemed to help to increase the TFP 
(see above).13 The high degree of political instability ended in 1980 and macroeconomic 
management was also quite good during the 1980s14 compared to the poor performance 
of the 1970s (see Figure 1). 
Compared to the 1970s, in the 1980s capital accumulation slowed (see Table 1). This 
is in line with the view that the export-led growth of the 1980s was based on the produc-
tive capacities established during the 1970s. However, an increase in capital per worker 
remained an important ingredient during the 1980s, accounting for about 38 percent of 
growth. Compared to the preceding decade, the relative contribution of human capital 
formation fell and accounted for only about 14 percent of growth.
The growth rate of GDP per worker slowed substantially during the 1990s as it did 
in the 1970s, from 4 percent (1980s) to 2.5 percent (1990s). TFP is mainly responsible 
Figure 2. Time plot of TFP, α = 0.50 (1960 = 100)
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for this slowdown; its annual growth rate fell from 1.9 percent (1980s) to –0.04 percent 
(1990s). Three possible reasons for this slowdown were political instability and related 
populist and myopic policies (see Ismihan et al. 2005 and the references therein); the as-
sociated chronic and high level of macroeconomic instability, mainly due to the problems 
of public-sector imbalances; and the fall in infrastructure spending as a consequence of 
fiscal and political constraints (Ismihan et al. 2005).15 As a result of these changes, TFP 
made a negative contribution of about –1.4 percent to the growth in output per worker. On 
the other hand, an improvement in capital per worker contributed substantially to growth 
performance in this decade. This increase accounted for 83 percent of growth in output 
per worker. However, human capital formation contributed only about 18 percent. 
In the early 2000s, the growth rate of GDP per worker increased substantially, at an 
annual average rate of 3.4 percent. The principal contributor to this performance was an 
unprecedented rise in TFP growth, from –0.04 percent (1990s) to 2.3 percent (2000s). 
As a result, TFP accounted for more than two-thirds (68 percent) of growth in output per 
worker during the 2000s. Four factors could have been responsible for the speed-up in 
TFP: successful reduction of the inflation rate, fiscal discipline, and the resultant stable 
macroeconomic environment; institutional reforms to the central bank and public-sector 
spending and structural reforms to the financial sector; the relatively stable political and 
external environment; and the prospect of possible EU membership. Nevertheless, because 
Turkey experienced severe economic crises in 2000–2001, these factors—especially the 
first, third, and fourth—are more relevant for the 2002–2004 period. This is evident from 
the steep rise in TFP from 2001 to 2004 in Figure 2. 
Compared to the previous decades, the 23 percent contribution of physical capital 
accumulation was very weak in the early 2000s. Similarly, human capital formation 
contributed only about 9 percent. 
Explaining the Evolution of TFP Within a Simple Empirical Model
Many economists believe that sound economic policies can be vital to the growth perfor-
mance of developing countries by affecting productivity growth and capital formation. 
Considerable evidence supports this view (see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly 
and Rebelo 1993; Fischer 1993a, 1993b), A number of factors have received extensive 
attention as crucial determinants of TFP and growth: the stability of the macroeconomic 
policy environment, proxied by policy-induced macroeconomic instability variables, such 
as the inflation rate, budget deficit, foreign debt, and exchange rate variability; outward 
orientation or openness to foreign competition; diffusion of technology; and productive 
spending, especially on public infrastructure (see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly 
and Rebelo 1993; Fischer 1993a, 1993b; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Ismihan et al. 
2005; Sturm et al. 1998; Togan 2003). 
To shed light on the evolution of TFP in the Turkish economy, we investigate the role 
of the above-mentioned policy-related factors on TFP. We look at the empirical relation-
ships among macroeconomic instability (MII), the imports-to-GNP ratio (Imrat),16 the 
public infrastructure investment-to-GNP ratio (Igirat), and TFP (TFP050)17 in Turkey 
from 1960 to 2004. We are particularly interested in the dynamic effects of an increase in 
MII, Imrat, and Igirat on TFP050. In line with these aims, we form a cointegration system 
with these four variables.18 We use the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique in 
our analyses.19 Because our variables do not exhibit deterministic trends, we perform a 
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cointegration analysis with a constant term entering restrictively, but with no trend term 
in the cointegration space (see Hendry and Juselius 2001). 
Table 3 presents the cointegration result for a VAR(1).20 The trace and max statistics 
suggest one cointegration relation.21 We expected to a find a long-run TFP relation but 
there is none that is meaningful in the cointegration results reported in Table 3.22 How-
ever, as our principal empirical interest is to analyze the dynamic effects of an increase 
in MII, Imrat, and Igirat on TFP050, below we provide the GIR functions23 to examine 
the dynamic effects. That is, we analyze the short- and medium-run effects of a shock on 
a given variable (e.g., Imrat) on the TFP variable (TFP050). Figure 3 presents the GIR 
functions to a positive unit—one standard error (s.e.)—shock in MII, Imrat, and Igirat 
equations in panels (a), (b), and (c), respectively. 
To analyze the dynamic effects of an increase in macroeconomic instability (MII) on 
TFP, we examine the GIRs in Panel (a) of Figure 3. As expected, short- and medium-run 
responses of TFP to a rise in MII are negative. This result is in line with the analyses 
above and is consistent with the theoretical and empirical results (see Ismihan 2003 for 
more detail). However, the negative responses of TFP diminish over the medium term 
and approach zero.
We next turn to the dynamic effects of an increase in the imports-to-GNP ratio on TFP. 
As Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows, TFP is positively and permanently affected by an increase 
in the imports-to-GNP ratio. This result is consistent with the argument that an increase 
in the imports-to-GNP ratio may help to increase the TFP by increasing the competitive 
Table 3. Cointegration analysis
Tests of cointegration rank (r)
Eigenvalues 0.52709 0.25570 0.07028 0.04172
Null hypotheses r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3
Max statistic 32.95* 12.99 3.20 1.87
 95 percent critical valuea 28.14 22.00 15.67 9.24
 90 percent critical valuea 25.56 19.77 13.75 7.52
Trace statistic 51.02** 18.07 5.08 1.87
 95 percent critical valuea 53.12 34.91 19.96 9.24
 90 percent critical valuea 49.65 32.00 17.85 7.52
Cointegration results (rank = 1) 
 Imrat TFP050 MII Igirat
(b′)b 1 3.12 –70.80 5.69
Hypotheses testsc c2(u) u p-value
Test of significance of TFP050 5.75 1 0.01
Test of significance of MII 13.40 1 0.00
Test of significance of Igirat 11.75 1 0.00
Notes: a Critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, p. 468, table 1). b Standardized eigenvec-
tor. c Test of long-run exclusion (see Hendry and Juselius 2001). * Represents the rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level. ** Indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
10 percent significance level. 
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Figure 3. Generalized impulse responses
(a) GIR(s) to one s.e. shock in the equation for MII
(b) GIR(s) to one s.e. shock in the equation for Imrat
(c) GIR(s) to one s.e. shock in the equation for Igirat
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pressures in the domestic economy through foreign competition (as noted above). This 
result is also in line with the argument of Grossman and Helpman (1991) that countries 
can acquire know-how from abroad, via imports, helping to increase TFP. 
Last, we examine the dynamic effects of a rise in total public infrastructure investment-
to-GNP ratio (Igirat) on TFP. The short-run responses of TFP to a rise in Igirat are 
positive as expected (see Figure 3, Panel (c)). This result is also in line with the obser-
vations above. However, the positive responses of TFP diminish over the medium term 
and stabilize at negative (but relatively small) values. One possible explanation for this 
fall-off is that the financing of public investment spending may create fiscal and related 
problems, causing a rise in the level of macroeconomic instability over some period of 
time and, thus, decreasing TFP.
The empirical analysis is also extended by considering the components of public in-
frastructure investment—namely, energy and transportation and communication (T&C). 
In other words, we redo the above cointegration and impulse response analyses for two 
alternative versions by substituting public energy and T&C investment as a share of 
GNP for total public infrastructure investment (Igirat). Although public T&C invest-
ment is found to affect TFP significantly, public energy is found not to affect TFP over 
the medium term, as in the case for total public infrastructure investment.24 The former 
result is in line with our expectations, but the latter is not. As in the case of total public 
infrastructure investment, this might be due to the negative effect of financing of public 
energy projects on macroeconomic stability and, hence, on TFP. Another possible expla-
nation for this result is the significant reduction of the public-sector share in total energy 
investments during the 1990s, mainly due to the privatization of public enterprises and 
fiscal restraints on the government. That said, the public investment data may not be a 
good indicator of the availability of infrastructure of any kind. 
Our main results in this section also hold when we substitute other TFP measures—
TFP035 and TFP065 (see Appendix)—for TFP050. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The results of the growth accounting exercises suggest that both TFP and capital accu-
mulation were crucial sources of growth during the sample period. However, TFP growth 
displayed enormous variation over the 1960–2004 period, mainly due to severe structural 
changes and significant instabilities in macroeconomic and political environment. 
In line with the results from the descriptive analysis, empirical evidence suggests that 
TFP seems to be positively affected by imports and public infrastructure investment and 
negatively affected by macroeconomic instability for the period under study.
Our results have three policy implications. First, our findings confirm the notion that 
a stable macroeconomic environment is a precondition for sustainable growth. Thus, 
current and future governments in Turkey must implement sound economic policies to 
avoid the adverse effects of macroeconomic instability on TFP, capital accumulation, 
and, hence, growth. Second, policymakers should be more sensitive in their decisions 
regarding the composition of overall public spending. They should not cut spending on 
growth-enhancing items, such as education, research and development, and infrastructure 
investment, while preserving macroeconomic stability. Our results are also in line with 
the widely accepted view that the foreign trade can help to increase TFP and, hence, eco-
nomic growth. Therefore, the third policy implication of this study is that policymakers 
should promote outward-oriented growth in Turkey. 
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Notes
1. During this period, populist cycles, high and volatile inflation rates, huge budget deficits, 
excessive debt accumulation, and the resulting severe economic crises were the recurrent mac-
roeconomic issues in the Turkish economy. Real GDP grew at a low average annual rate of 3.5 
percent, from 1976 to 2001.
2. During the 2002–5 period, real GDP grew very rapidly, at an annual average of 7.5 percent. 
On the other hand, the inflation rate (percentage change in GNP deflator), which roughly indicates 
macroeconomic instability (see Fischer 1993b), fell from 55.3 percent in 2001 to 5.3 percent in 
2005. 
3. Factors such as institutional and structural reforms, the successful monetary performance 
of a more independent Turkish central bank, relatively stable political and external environment, 
and the prospect of EU membership have also contributed to favorable performance.
4. See, e.g., Celasun and Rodrik (1989), Ertugrul and Selcuk (2002), Ismihan (2003), 
Metin-Ozcan et al. (2001), and the references therein for more detail on Turkey’s macroeconomic 
history.
5. The macroeconomic instability index (MII) is useful to evaluate and compare the level 
of macroeconomic instability within and between time periods. Moreover, it is a relatively more 
comprehensive measure of macroeconomic instability, as it is based on several macroeconomic 
instability indicators, such as the inflation rate, change in exchange rate, public deficit–to-GNP 
ratio, and external debt–to-GNP ratio (see Ismihan 2003 for more detail).
6. Turkey also suffered a severe economic crisis in 1994. 
7. See Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2008)—a working paper version of this study—for more 
detail on the utilized growth accounting framework.
8. TFP growth is calculated as a residual from a growth accounting formula. Thus, TFP growth 
can be thought of as a measure of gains (or losses) in economic efficiency, but one should not 
forget that it reflects “a myriad of determinants, in addition to technological innovation, that influ-
ence growth but that were not accounted for by the measured increases in factor inputs. Examples 
include the implications of sustained political turmoil, external shocks, changes in government 
policy, institutional changes or measurement errors” (Bosworth and Collins 2003, p. 3). 
9. Clearly, the only parameter determining the relative contribution of the three factors (sources) 
is α. Thus, the choice of an appropriate value for α is a crucial step in the growth accounting exer-
cises. See Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2008) for more detail on the choice of the value of α. In this 
study, we also reworked the growth accounting exercises for several plausible values of α. That is, 
we performed a sensitivity analysis with the plausible minimum (α = 0.35) and maximum values 
of α (α = 0.65). Even if the importance of TFP growth and physical (as well as human) capital 
accumulation change in opposite directions as we change the value of α, the general trends of the 
three sources remain the same. Moreover, our interpretations of those trends will not change. The 
results of the sensitivity analysis can be requested from the first author.
10. All the reported growth rates refer to the average annual rate of growth over the relevant 
period.
11. See Ismihan (2003) and Ismihan et al. (2005) for the empirical and theoretical backgrounds 
on the role of macroeconomic instability in output and TFP growth.
12. This observation is in line with the argument of Grossman and Helpman (1991) that coun-
tries can acquire know-how from abroad through imports, as the imported goods embody foreign 
technology.
13. See, e.g., Sturm et al. (1998) for an overview of the role of public capital in TFP growth.
14. Especially due to the successful stabilization during the early 1980s. However, macroeco-
nomic instability increased during the late 1980s, mainly due to a rise in political instability (see 
Figure 1). In line with these developments, the steady rise in TFP over the early and mid-1980s 
ended in 1987, and the TFP level fell from 1987 to 1989 (see Figure 2).
15. Turkey formed a customs union with the European Union in 1995; this increased the 
imports-to-GNP ratio and possibly helped to increase TFP, at least temporarily (as evident in 
Figure 2). However, this favorable effect on TFP seems to be offset by the unfavorable conse-
quences of political instability, unsound macroeconomic policies, and associated high levels of 
macroeconomic instability.
16. A rise in the imports-to-GNP ratio may help to increase TFP by increasing the competi-
tion and also by increasing the diffusion of know-how from abroad. According to Grossman and 
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Helpman (1991), countries can acquire know-how from abroad through imports, as the imported 
goods embody foreign technology.
17. The Appendix presents the details on definitions and sources of data.
18. Besides the theoretical considerations, the choice of variables is also affected by several 
other considerations, such as data availability and the limitations of a cointegrated VAR analysis 
with small sample size. Thus, other relevant variables (e.g., research and development expenditures 
as a share of output) are not included in the system.
19. Each of the four series (MII, Imrat, Igirat, TFP050) contains a unit root. ADF and Perron 
test results are available at a working paper version of this study (Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan 2008). 
They can be also requested from the authors. 
20. The LR test suggests a VAR(1). The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) also suggests VAR(1). 
The TFP050 equation in VAR(1) model shows heteroskedasticity and nonnormality. This is clearly 
evident in the residual plot of that equation, in which 1994 and 1999 are outlying observations. 
We include an impulse dummy for 1994 (for the severe economic crisis) and 1999 (for the terrible 
earthquake in that year) unrestrictively in the VAR(1) model. After including this dummy, none 
of the equations shows serious autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and nonnormality. However, 
the qualitative nature of our cointegration results is not changed, even if we do not consider these 
impulse dummies in our analysis.
21. The trace and max statistics also suggest one cointegration relation when we account for 
the 1980 structural change.
22. Economic intuition seems to suggest the following simple long-run import relation based 
on the cointegration results in Table 3: Imrat = 91.9 + 70.8 MII – 3.1 TFP050 – 5.7 Igirat. This 
equation implies that imports (as a share of output) are positively affected by macroeconomic in-
stability and negatively affected by TFP and public infrastructure investment (as a share of output) 
for the period under study.
23. Contrary to the orthogonalized impulse response functions, generalized impulse response 
functions do not depend on the ordering of the variables within the system (Pesaran and Shin 1998). 
Thus, we prefer to use the generalized impulse response functions in our analysis.
24. The results of generalized impulse response analyses for the two alternative versions of the 
model can be requested from the first author.
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Appendix
Iprat (Igrat) is real private (public) investment (percent share of real GNP). Both real 
GNP and investment are at 1998 constant prices. Source: State Planning Organization 
(SPO).
Igirat is real public infrastructure investment (percent share of real GNP). Both real GNP 
and public investment are at 1998 constant prices. Public infrastructure investment is the 
total of the public energy, transportation, and communication sectors’ fixed investments. 
Source: SPO.
Imrat (Exrat) is imports (exports)-to-GNP ratio (percent). Source: State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS/Turkstat).
The macroeconomic instability index (MII) proxies macroeconomic instability. This index 
is calculated by using human development index (HDI) methodology; it is based on 
macroeconomic instability indicators;—namely, the inflation rate, public deficit-to-GNP 
ratio, external debt-to-GNP ratio, and change in exchange rate. It is a simple average of 
the four subindices obtained from these four variables. MII is bounded between 0 and 1 
due to its construction. Source: Ismihan (2003).
Infl represents the inflation rate, calculated as a percentage change in the GNP deflator 
(1998 = 100). Source: SPO.
Output (Y) is measured by GDP (at 1998 prices, billions of Turkish lira). The State Institute 
of Statistics (SIS/Turkstat) has provided GDP series extending back as far as 1968. We 
extended this series back to 1960. See Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2008) for details.
Capital stock (K) is at 1998 constant prices, estimated with the perpetual inventory 
method. See Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2008) for details. 
Labor (L) input is measured by employment data. Source: State Institute of Statistics 
(SIS).
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Human Capital (H) is obtained as follows: H = hL, where h is the educational attainment 
per worker. See Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2008) for details. 
TFP050, TFP035, and TFP065 refer to the estimated series of TFP with α set at 0.50, 
0.35, and 0.65, respectively. 
To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.

